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Abstract: 
American social and political discourse attests to widespread concern about whether 
domestic corporations can be counted on to serve the national interest.  This issue is 
especially pressing in an era of international corporate operations, in which firms can 
send jobs and tax revenues overseas, devastating local communities even as they boost 
the prospects of workers in a foreign land, and the interests of capital spread across 
the globe.  Firms founded in America can also disperse across the border productive 
resources that could be nationalized or otherwise made available to the homeland in 
times of crisis or war.  Indeed, the shareholder primacy norm at the heart of American 
corporate governance law may compel directors to do these things, or at least consider 
doing them.  This Article assesses the legal status and normative desirability of cor-
porate patriotism. 
I. Introduction 
In July 2014, President Barack Obama condemned corporations that re-charter 
from the United States to foreign jurisdictions in order to avoid American tax 
liability as “economic deserters.”1 Obama’s scorching epithet echoed and perhaps 
amplified longstanding social and political concerns about whether domestic 
corporations can be expected to serve the national interest. This question is 
especially pressing in an era in which many American corporations have global 
operations. Such firms can send both tax revenues and jobs overseas, devastating 
local communities even as they boost the prospects of workers in a foreign land, and 
the interests of capital spread across the globe.2 American firms can also disperse 
across borders productive resources that could otherwise be nationalized or made 
available to the homeland in times of crisis or war. Indeed, the shareholder primacy 
in corporate governance law may compel directors to do these things, or at least 
consider doing them. This Article assesses the legal status and normative 
desirability of corporate patriotism.   
Patriotism is love for one’s country. Like other kinds of love, patriotism motivates 
voluntary action. Quintessentially, a patriotic conscience spurs a willingness to 
 
1. See Jeff Mason, Obama Rails Against Corporate Maneuver to Evade U.S. Taxes, REUTERS (July 25, 
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/25/us-usa-tax-obama-inversions-idUSKBN0FT13K 
20140725.   
2. There have been international businesses as long as there have been nations.  See Linda A. 
Mabry, Multinational Corporations and U.S. Technology Policy: Rethinking the Concept of 
Corporate Nationality, 87 GEO. L.J. 563, 569 (1999). Nevertheless, before the second-half of the 
20th-century, even large corporations typically were chartered, produced, and sold goods in only 
one country. Id. Corporate operations went global in every sense after World War II. By the 
1990s, multinational corporations controlled one-third of all private-sector assets. Id. In the 
early 21st-century, multinational corporations have become dominant social, economic, political 
and cultural forces.   
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sacrifice in service to one’s nation. This is often conceived as putting the nation 
before one’s self-interest. But because people’s lives are interconnected, patriotic 
self-sacrifice may also inevitably involve sacrifice of one’s other responsibilities, for 
example, to a spouse, or child, or perhaps one’s business associates, in favor of 
serving the nation. There are elaborate intellectual debates about the significance 
and legitimacy of patriotism within academic philosophy.3 But that literature is 
bereft of any meaningful attention to the role of patriotic conscience on the part of 
corporations. Corporate law scholarship, on the other hand, showcases thorough 
intellectual debates about the legitimacy of corporate “social responsibility” 
generally, but has not addressed the legitimacy of patriotism as an element of 
corporate social responsibility. This Article seeks to bridge these two literatures, 
while adding something to each. 
Corporations are legal entities, created by government, and made available to 
anyone who wants to use the corporate form to undertake “any lawful act.”4 Those 
who start a corporation have broad latitude to specify how the entity will be run, and 
for whose benefit.5  But the default rule under the most widely used corporate law 
in the United States, the Delaware General Corporation Law, is that corporations 
must be managed to serve the interests of the shareholders, and not any other 
stakeholder group.6 The interests of workers, consumers, future generations, 
animals, or the environment, may be taken into account in corporate governance 
decisions, but only to the extent that doing so is rationally related to advancing the 
shareholder interest.7 This corporate law command to always put shareholders first 
 
3. See STEPHEN NATHANSON, PATRIOTISM, MORALITY, AND PEACE (1993) (book-length study, 
summarizing literature); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF 
PATRIOTISM (Joshua Cohen ed., 1993) (collection of essays by leading intellectuals discussing 
patriotism); see also infra Section II (discussing literature). 
4. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (West 2015) (specifying that “the certificate of incorporation shall 
set forth . . . the nature of the business or purposes to be conducted or promoted” and stating that 
“[i]t shall be sufficient to  state . . . that the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act 
or activity for which corporations may be organized.").  
5. See generally David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public Benefit 
Corporation Trivial? (manuscript on file with author) (arguing that shareholder primacy can be 
altered through private-ordering in the corporate charter). 
6. In the United States, business promoters can purchase a corporate charter from any state they 
choose. Businesses need not use the corporate law of the state in which they are headquartered or 
where they otherwise do business. Delaware has dominated the “market” for corporate charters 
since the early-20th century, for reasons that continue to be debated in the academic literature. 
Most scholars agree that Delaware dominates because its law serves the interests of shareholders 
better than available alternatives. See generally John Armour, et. al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 
IND. L.J. 1345 (2012) (reviewing explanations for why Delaware dominates).   
7. Some scholars argue that Delaware’s corporate law is ambiguous or ambivalent on the question of 
whether directors must serve only shareholders, or whether they are permitted to also attend to 
other interests at the expense of shareholders.  See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 
(2012); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 
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would seem to be in tension with the idea of patriotism, or at least the idea of 
corporate patriotism. Nevertheless, canonical justifications for prevailing corporate 
law insist that although directors are required to manage firms only on behalf of 
shareholders, this rule turns out to be the rule that best serves all stakeholders, and 
society generally.8 This view has not been explicitly tested against the commands of 
patriotism. This Article undertakes such a test.   
To think about corporations operating with a patriotic conscience requires some 
idea of corporate nationality. This is not a straightforward matter. Is a firm that is 
chartered in the United States, but produces with workers in China, and sells its 
products in France, on behalf of Russian investors, an American company? In an 
important sense, it is.  Corporations do not exist without the law and the sovereignty 
that creates them.9 My approach here is to consider firms that are chartered in the 
United States, under American law, to be American corporations. This is not an 
exhaustive conception, but it is an important starting place for analyzing the 
problem of corporate patriotism. If patriotism is an important American value, then 
we should expect our corporate law to prudently reflect patriotic concerns. And, of 
course, if patriotism is an important Irish value, then the Irish should expect the 
issue to be prudently reflected in their corporate law. This justification for using the 
chartering nation as an approach to assessing corporate patriotism has nothing yet 
to say about what the substance of that law should be. That question is pursued 
throughout the course of this Article.10   
 
(2005). I critique these scholars’ claims and insist that shareholder primacy is the law of Delaware 
in David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181 (2013).  While my 
descriptive view of corporate law is relevant to the present analysis, the arguments pursued here 
do not depend on the correctness of that position.  Therefore, I urge those who doubt that 
shareholder primacy is the law to continue reading despite our disagreement on that point. 
8. See, e.g., STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
(2008).   
9. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 
110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000) (explaining that central attributes of corporations, including legal 
segregation of corporate assets from the assets of the firm’s owners, can only be achieved by 
affirmative state action). 
10. Existing scholarship reveals three basic approaches to designating corporate nationality.  The 
first is by chartering nation, which most scholars and policymakers seem to consider passé, but 
which I use, and perhaps resuscitate, for the reasons stated in the text.  See Mabry, supra note 
3, at 583–84. The second is the “control test,” which looks at the nation, or nationality, that 
actually controls the corporation. Id. at 566. I pursue control issues infra, Section III, when 
examining the relevance of the nationalities of corporate board members. But there my focus is 
the nationalities of the board members of American corporations, which, again, requires a 
starting place for what counts as an American corporation, and my starting place is the 
chartering nation. A third test is the “economic commitment” test, which designates corporate 
nationhood on the basis of where a firm is most deeply economically enmeshed. See id. at 593. 
Under this test, a firm that is chartered in the United States but owned by shareholders around 
the world, produces in China, and sells in Europe, would not be considered an American 
corporation. The type of test that should be used depends on the purpose of the inquiry. Id. at 
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American corporations in a few specific industries (fewer than in the past) are 
subject to specific charting, ownership, and governance regulations aimed at forcing 
those firms to operate in ways that serve, or at least do not compromise, American 
interests.11 Such regulations suggest that the general shareholder primacy story – 
that firms run for shareholders advance the interests of society as a whole – is not 
necessarily reliable, or at least has not been swallowed whole, politically.12 In any 
event, this Article is concerned with the default law that governs all corporate 
operations. After all, it may be difficult to know ahead of time what kinds of 
companies are, or will suddenly become, of acute national importance. And when 
that knowledge does arrive it may be too late for ordinary political processes, or even 
extraordinary political processes, to take effect. Consider, for example, that global 
pharmaceutical companies could become of vital national interest during an 
international pandemic, which might spread across the globe too chaotically for 
 
593–633. See also Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy: 
Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REV. 401, 453 (2002) (proposing a “domestic 
participation” test of corporate nationality).  
11. See generally Detlev F. Vagts, The Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal Restraints 
on Foreign Enterprise, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1961) (landmark and still essential study). 
According to Vagts, anxieties about foreign influence on domestic enterprise trace to the colonial 
era, but concomitant early-American thirst for capital rendered restrictions on foreign 
investment in the United States relatively anemic until the early-twentieth-century. Id. at 
1493. The advent of World War I revealed extensive foreign ownership of American enterprise, 
as billions were repatriated at the start of the war from the United States to the coffers of allies 
and enemies alike. Id. at 1491. In response, “[t]he 1916-1930 period saw a proliferation of 
legislation restricting alien participation in such areas as radio, aircraft, shipping, and 
petroleum production.” Id. at 1493. After World War II, the growing wealth of the United States, 
and its new role as a global investor, dampened concerns about foreign investment in domestic 
enterprise. Id. at 1493. Writing in 1961, Vagts correctly predicted that, “the future portends 
contraction . . . of restrictive legislation except in defense industries.” Id. at 1494. The last 
several decades have seen relaxation of foreign ownership restrictions in energy, aviation, and 
communication industries. Nevertheless, there are continuing ebbs and flows. In 1975, 
President Gerald Ford issued an executive order establishing the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which he charged with making recommendations 
regarding foreign investment activity that could undermine American interests.  See Paul 
Connell & Tian Huang, An Empirical Analysis of CFIUS: Examining Foreign Investment 
Regulation in the United States, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 131, 135–36 (2014).  In 1988, Congress 
granted the President the power to block foreign investment deemed a threat to national 
security. Id. at 136. This power was delegated to CFIUS, making it a powerful administrative 
entity. Id. at 137. CFIUS’s initial charge was limited to reviewing investment in just a few 
industries, but its authority continually expanded over ensuing decades, and increased 
dramatically after the attacks of September 11, 2001.   See id. at 132–33, 137.  CFIUS, and 
other federal regulations restricting foreign influence in American business are important 
interventions, but for present purposes they are the exceptions that prove the rule: in the 
ordinary course, the vast majority of corporations are not subject to laws that encourage or 
require them to be governed in a manner that privileges American interests over the interests 
of other nations. 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 43-58 (explaining and critiquing prevailing justifications for 
shareholder primacy in corporate governance).   
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political processes to operate effectively. In such a case, a patriotic company might 
direct emergency resources disproportionately to the United States. Absent a 
patriotic conscience, it might not.13 The “time of crisis” angle may just provide a 
salient way of thinking about how we want corporate decision-making to operate at 
more routine margins. We may want corporations to regularly operate with a 
patriotic conscience, or to behave patriotically when the same profit can be made 
advancing American interests as can be made favoring the interests of some other 
country, or no country.14   
This Article proceeds as follows. Section II begins with a discussion of the 
normative legitimacy of patriotism generally. To know how we want our corporate 
law to intersect with patriotic impulses, we must first evaluate whether patriotism 
is something to be valued or avoided.  With that philosophical review as background, 
Section II concludes by assessing more deeply the relationship between prevailing 
corporate governance law and concerns about patriotism. Section III examines the 
mechanics of corporate patriotism, and begins by emphasizing the intersection 
between patriotic conscience and the composition of corporate boards of directors, 
since it is the board that controls the corporation. That section then briefly examines 
reforms that might be pursued to either more intensely restrain corporate 
patriotism, or give patriotic conscience greater reign in corporate operations. Section 
IV gives a conclusion.    
 
13. See Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary Exemption for Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, and 
the Hobson’s Choice During a National Crisis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 661 (2010). Rhee explores 
the possibility of corporate law embracing a fiduciary “safe harbor” that would allow corporate 
directors to deviate from shareholder primacy in times of crisis, and he uses a pandemic as an 
example of such a crisis. Rhee’s outstanding article does not explore the relationship between his 
idea of “fiduciary exemption” and patriotism, i.e., which country a corporation should favor, if any, 
in times of international crisis.   
14. This Article is meant as a general exploration of the legitimacy of corporate patriotism, and is thus 
intended to meaningfully inform thinking about these issues from any national perspective.  
Nevertheless, my presentation here sometimes focuses on American interests in vindicating or 
repudiating corporate patriotism, and sometimes even uses the pronoun “we” in the inquiry.  I do 
this with reservation, but not without reasons.  First, to write intelligently about corporate 
patriotism we must write about corporate law, and to write about corporate law we must write 
about a body of corporate law.  My expertise is on the law of Delaware, which is the most influential 
corporate law in the United States, and so this inquiry is undertaken in that legal context.   Second, 
I am an American, and part of what motivates this inquiry is my desire to better understand what 
I, and my countrymen and women, should think about corporate patriotism as it relates to our own 
national interests.  Third, prose about patriotism, a specific kind of love, cannot clearly express 
what it means to say when the words must always be deployed at a level of generality and 
abstraction. Despite this, I hope that the analysis developed here will resonate with and be relevant 
to scholars and citizens of other nations who are struggling to think through the legality and 
desirability of corporate patriotism. 
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II. The Normative Valence of Patriotism and Corporate Law 
To know if corporate patriotism is desirable, we must first assess whether 
patriotism itself is normatively defensible. Such an assessment is not sufficient to 
vindicate corporate patriotism, but it is necessary.   
A. Patriotism as Vice, Corporate Law as Virtue 
Patriotism is pervasive. In mainstream political discourse it operates as 
orthodoxy and assumption. It abides in the conscience of most ordinary men and 
women, to different degrees, and in different ways.15 Yet even among those who 
recognize within themselves a patriotic sentiment, proudly express it, and believe 
themselves willing to act on it, the impulse is suspect. The patriotic conscience is 
haunted by the worry that it may be stupid or corrupt, or both. Stupid, because, 
except for immigrants, one’s homeland is an accident of their birth. It seems foolish 
to base a special regard, a motivating affection, on mere happenstance. This 
happenstance might still generate a legitimate patriotism if one could claim that 
their country really is the most deserving of nations, but judgement about which 
country is better or best are, of course, infected with motivated reasoning and 
subjectivity as to what counts in national comparisons.16   
Worse than being stupid, patriotism may be corrupt, and corrupting. It is a 
dangerous kindle, threatening always to blaze into discrimination, xenophobia and 
imperialism.17 Even short of such horrors, it still seems morally dubious to favor the 
prospects of one’s countrymen (countrypeople) over the people of other countries, 
simply on the basis of national identity. Being patriotic does not require that a 
person be prepared to go to any lengths for their nation, or be willing to treat 
foreigners in any way, no matter how rapacious, to serve one’s homeland. But 
 
15. The World Values Survey finds patriotism to be widespread among the peoples of the world, with 
Americans among the most patriotic.  “The United States indeed has the highest percentages of 
‘very proud’ nationals over 25 years [of survey data].”  Jerome Karabel & Daniel Laurison, An 
Exceptional Nation? American Political Values in Comparative Perspective 22 (Institute for 
Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper No. 136–12, 2012), available at 
http://irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/136-12.pdf. Another group of researchers concludes that, 
generally, “Europe and Asia are less patriotic than the Americas, Africa, and the Middle East.”  
Adair Morse & Sophie Shive, Patriotism in Your Portfolio, 14 J. FIN. MARKETS 411, 414 (2011).    
16. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the 
Human Animal, 93 GEO. L. REV. 1, 102–05 (2004) (reviewing social psychological research on 
human decision-making, including motivated reasoning and confirmation bias). 
17. George Orwell distinguished patriotism from nationalism, insisting that the former was 
characterized by “devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to 
be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people,” while “[t]he abiding purpose of 
every nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige . . . for the nation.” George Orwell, 
Notes on Nationalism, 1 POLEMIC 1 (1945), available at http://orwell.ru/library/essays/nationalism/ 
english/e_nat.  
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patriotism does seem to involve a willingness to privilege one’s own nation and treat 
people of other nations differently at some significant margin.  And that is the 
margin at which patriotism is an important moral problem. Enlightened, liberal 
morality requires us to treat all people equally, and to consider them to be equally 
valuable and worthy, unless they have shown themselves for some good reason not 
to be.18 Patriotism cannot even be regarded as just another kind of preference which 
should be respected as a personal choice of the “there’s no accounting for taste” 
variety. For, in this assessment, “patriotism is like racism.”19 From the point of view 
of liberal morality, then, patriotism surely is a vice. It should be actively repudiated, 
and certainly not patronized by legal designs.   
If patriotism by natural people is pernicious, then it seems unlikely that corporate 
patriotism would be desirable. We would do well to organize a corporate law that 
ignores or excludes it. This we appear to have done. At least formally, shareholder 
primacy in corporate governance precludes corporations from acting with a patriotic 
conscience.20 If patriotism is a vice, then the exclusion of patriotic conscience from 
corporate operations counts as a morally desirable feature—a bonus feature—of 
shareholder primacy in corporate governance law.   
Consider here an illustrative episode involving the response of American 
corporations to the OPEC oil embargo of 1973-1974.21 In retaliation for western 
support of Israel during the Arab-Israeli War, Arab nations threatened to 
nationalize the property of major oil companies if they supplied oil to the United 
States, several European countries, or South Africa. American corporations 
complied, which was perhaps not in itself unpatriotic, given that the choice was 
comply or be nationalized by foreigners. However, the Arab nations imposing the 
boycott did not seek to control the way companies distributed oil that they obtained 
from other parts of the world. American oil companies could have privileged 
American interests and shipped all available oil to the United States. Indeed, the 
federal government was “urging U.S.-origin oil companies to bring as much oil as 
possible into the United States.”22 Or, these corporations could have sold the oil to 
 
18. Most people consider it morally acceptable to privilege one’s own family, or at least one’s own 
children, over the interests of strangers.  See, e.g., ADAM SWIFT, HOW NOT TO BE A HYPOCRITE: 
SCHOOL CHOICE FOR THE MORALLY PERPLEXED PARENT (2003) (examining the legitimacy of, and 
moral limits to, parents’ preferences for their own children).  But this begs the question: do 
compatriots deserve to be treated specially, like family, or is it capricious to treat them better than 
one treats other kinds of strangers?   
19. See Paul Gomberg, Patriotism is Like Racism, 101 ETHICS 144, 144 (1990).   
20. But see infra, text accompanying notes 68-70 (discussing the problem of “patriotic slack”).  
21. See Mabry, supra note 2, at 620–22 (relying on STAFF OF S. COMM. ON MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS, 93D CONG., REP. ON MULTINATIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
67 (Comm. Print 1975)). 
22. Mabry, supra note 2, at 622 n. 236. 
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the highest bidder. Instead, what they decided to do was apportion the oil equally 
among countries affected by the embargo.23 That decision could be made to fit easily 
into a “just so” shareholder wealth maximization story, since the firms may have 
been aiming to maintain good relations across their customer base in anticipation of 
a return to normal business dynamics.24  But it surely was not patriotic, in the sense 
of putting America first, especially in a time of crisis.  In effect, it was a choice that 
treated all the peoples of the world as being of one dignity.  If patriotism is a vice, 
then shareholder primacy may be called virtuous, or at least virtue’s servant. 
There is an ironic or “strange bedfellows” implication to this analysis.  I speculate 
that the kind of people who regard themselves as strong proponents of universal 
humanism, and who are generally suspicious of the legitimacy of treating people 
differently on the basis of nationality, might, as a demographic matter, also be the 
kind of people who are generally suspicious of the shareholder primacy norm in 
corporate law.  But if shareholder primacy excludes, and undermines, patriotic 
conscience in favor of a more even-handed treatment of people across the planet, 
then proponents of universal humanism might be more attracted to shareholder 
primacy law than they would have thought.  Irony being a two-way street, 
proponents of shareholder primacy in corporate governance might be more 
committed to the pursuit of universal humanism, and the denigration of national 
difference, than they would have expected.    
B. Patriotism as Virtue, Corporate Law as Vice 
There is, however, a sophisticated tradition in moral philosophy which vindicates 
the widespread human tendency to be patriotic, and insists that patriotism is a 
virtue.  As we approach these arguments, we should perhaps apply a kind of 
heightened scrutiny before we are willing to accept them.  It might be ethically 
desirable to start with a presumption against the legitimacy of a moral outlook, like 
patriotism, which sanctions treating people differently on the basis of inherited and 
largely immutable characteristics.  We should demand compelling arguments in 
favor of patriotism if they are to overcome this presumption.25  
A plausible approach to justifying patriotism was supplied by the great moral 
 
23. Id. at 622. 
24. Cf. RUDYARD KIPLING, JUST SO STORIES (1902) (fantastical stories purporting to explain how 
different animals came to have their unique attributes). 
25. This heightened standard of review for “suspect classifications” is routine in legal analysis.  See 
Richard E. Levy, Political Process and Individual Fairness Rationales in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Suspect Classification Jurisprudence, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 33, 35 (2010) (reviewing and assessing 
contours of suspect classification analysis).  But it does not appear to be conventional in moral 
philosophy.   
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philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, in his seminal lecture, “Is Patriotism a Virtue?”26  
MacIntyre conjectures that the liberal conception of morality, which I summarized 
in the previous sub-section, mistakenly thinks of morality as something like 
mathematics, which can be thought, taught, and internalized without reference to 
the particulars of human culture and experience.  To the contrary, whether or not 
moral principles are themselves eternal and objective, becoming a moral person 
always involves specific, subjective experience.  As a matter of human reality, it may 
turn out that “an essential characteristic of the morality which each of us acquires 
[is] that it is learned from, in, and through the way of life of some particular 
community.”27  While it is true that the moral principles of most cultures will 
“resemble and sometimes be identical”28 with each other, it is nevertheless also true 
that learning to embrace those principles must be grounded in experience of and 
devotion to a distinct “social order.”29  It is not so much that our moral communities 
lead us to different moralities, it is that a special commitment to our community, a 
sense of identification with it, the kind of identification that spurs a willingness and 
desire to serve its interests and sacrifice for it, is psychologically necessary for any 
of us to learn any morality.30  If this is true, then patriotism is not only acceptable, 
it is commendable, and even imperative, if humans are to be moral creatures. 
It may be suggested that even if MacIntyre shows that patriotism is necessary for 
moral development, it does not follow that patriotism must be, or can be, a 
component of a resultant, fully developed morality.  Once matured, a person may be 
able to push away the scaffolding of patriotic sentiment, in order to regard and treat 
all humans equally.  But I think that suggestion is not consistent with MacIntyre’s 
conjecture.  If the morally mature person looks past her own community, seeing and 
treating all others in a scrupulously universalist fashion, then her own conduct 
threatens to undermine the maintenance of the moral community, replete with 
specific devotion, on which moral development for others depends.  By acting in a 
morally “superior” fashion herself, the supposedly mature universalist undermines 
the conditions of morality as such.31 
MacIntyre’s defense of patriotism implies that parochialism is necessary to 
achieve anything that comes close to what we want for humanity when we otherwise 
 
26. See ALASDAIR MACINTRYRE, IS PATRIOTISM A VIRTUE?: THE LINDLEY LECTURE (1984).  The title of 
this Article is an homage to MacIntyre’s influential lecture.     
27. Id. at 8.   
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 9. 
30. This approach to patriotism is consonant with the laudable trend in legal scholarship which looks 
to find grounding in a realistic assessment of human cognition and behavior, and expose important 
limitations of methods attached to more abstract conceptions of humanity, such as a simple 
“rational actor” model. See generally Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 16, at 10.     
31. I am grateful to Robert Shanklin for his interlocution with me on this issue.   
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celebrate universalism.  Embracing patriotism as a virtue will allow people the 
world over, in particular nations, to flourish better than they otherwise could 
without the morality-making powers of patriotism.  Put differently, it may be that 
in the “long-run” patriotism best serves the interests of all of humanity.  Yet even if 
that is true, it is also still true that along time horizons other than the “long-run,” 
and for particular people, perhaps whole generations, patriotism will sanction 
narrowly construed illiberalism.  This may be a regrettable, hard-hearted reality, 
especially, for example, when we are talking about the allocation of scarce resources.  
And we are always talking about the allocation of scarce resources.32     
But even if patriotism is necessary, it need not be, indeed, it must not be, 
dogmatic.  A blind devotion to one’s country, an unwillingness to see its flaws and 
faults, would make national pride a childish fiction, instead of a rich source of 
community-based morality-making.  Undoubtedly, a nation’s critics are often just as 
motivated by patriotic love as are a nation’s boosters.  Native critics of America, for 
example, often feel and express themselves in terms of shame or embarrassment.  
These are emotions that could only be felt by a patriot, never by an enemy or a 
neutral.  You cannot be disappointed in something that you do not regard with a 
special tenderness.33  Critical assessment of one’s social order is evidence that the 
morality making powers of patriotism are working.  According to MacIntyre, instead 
of blindly accepting one’s nation as it is or has been, what a morally functional 
patriotism requires is commitment to the nation “as a project.”34 
MacIntyre’s lecture was a compelling exposition of the possible legitimacy, or even 
necessity, of parochialism in human morality.  But there is little in it that explains 
why the nation should or must describe the contours of that parochialism.  Martha 
Nussbaum, also a proponent of patriotism, does a better job of explaining that when 
she argues that the nation is the largest organizational structure that can plausibly 
sustain the sentiments of devotion that are necessary for the kind of community-
grounded, efficacious morality that Macintyre describes.35  For Nussbaum, patriotic 
 
32. The “long-term” is not always a satisfying time-horizon for social policy.  It is a repugnant time-
horizon, for example, for people who are starving now.  Indeed, “in the long run, we are all 
dead.”  JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923).  See David G. 
Yosifon, The Social Relations of Consumption: Corporate Law and the Meaning of Consumer 
Culture, 2016 BYU L. REV. 101 (2016) (critiquing time-horizon ambiguity in the work of 
defenders of shareholder primacy).  
33. This is succinctly expressed by Leonard Cohen in his 1992 anthem, Democracy: “I love the country 
but / I can’t stand the scene.” LEONARD COHEN, Democracy, on THE FUTURE (Sony Records, 1992). 
34. MACINTYRE, supra note 26, at 13. 
35. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Teaching Patriotism: Love and Critical Freedom, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 213 
(2012) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Teaching Patriotism]; see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POLITICAL 
EMOTIONS: WHY LOVE MATTERS FOR JUSTICE 214 (2013) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, POLITICAL 
EMOTIONS].  Curiously, unlike most contemporary scholars writing about patriotism, Nussbaum 
does not address her arguments to MacIntyre’s treatment.  Nevertheless, her contributions build 
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love constitutes a kind of sweet spot at the intersection of size and effectiveness.  
Smaller groups, like families, are highly motivating, but too small in number to have 
substantial cooperative utility.  All of humanity is a nice size,36 but requires too much 
abstraction to induce more than “watery motivation” to pursue collective projects.37  
The nation is a community that can be plausibly imagined, and it is a potent kind of 
imagining.38  More than potent, it is also at least potentially a politically legitimate 
way of orchestrating a moral community (if democratically organized, for example).39     
Yes, patriotism can be “the last refuge of a scoundrel,”40 masking self-serving 
conduct and spurring mistreatment of out-groups.  But Nussbaum thinks the danger 
can be managed, and must be managed.  It is not plausible, she insists, to think that 
human society can be organized in strictly rational ways.  Emotion is going to 
operate in civic life.  It is better to confront that reality directly, so that emotion’s 
constructive aspects can be harnessed, and its destructive tendencies contained:   
If people interested in relief of poverty, justice for minorities, 
political and religious liberty, democracy, and global justice eschew 
symbol and rhetoric, fearing all appeals to emotion and imagination 
as inherently dangerous and irrational, people with less appetizing 
aims will monopolize these forces, to the detriment of democracy, 
and of people.41   
If, as philosophers like MacIntyre and Nussbaum insist, patriotism is a virtue, 
then there may be legitimate grounds to condemn the exclusion of patriotic 
conscience from corporate governance law.  It may be appropriate to worry that large 
American corporations with international operations, in their relentless pursuit of 
profit, will make decisions that harm the nation, or otherwise undermine the 
conditions upon which patriotism may flourish.   
C. Patriotism and Canonical Corporate Theory 
Proponents of the shareholder primacy norm in corporate governance would be 
 
nicely on MacIntyre’s framework.    
36. Nussbaum, Teaching Patriotism, supra note 36, at 224 (“Some believe that the very idea of a 
nation is a primitive one, to be superseded ultimately by the universal love of all humanity.”). 
37. Id. at 232.  Nussbaum’s use of “watery” motivation draws on Aristotle’s critique of the idea, 
discussed in Plato’s Republic, of raising children by the polity, rather than in families.  Id. (citing 
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 1262b (Ernest Baker trans., Oxford 1958)). 
38. See Richard D. Parker, Homeland: An Essay on Patriotism, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 407, 
427 (2002) (designating patriotism as a “precious resource”). 
39. NUSSBAUM, POLITICAL EMOTIONS, supra note 36, at 224 (“[E]ven in a world dedicated to the pursuit 
of global justice, the nation has a valuable role to play, as the largest unit we know so far that is 
sufficiently accountable to people and expressive of their voices.”). 
40. James Boswell attributed this enduring quip to Dr. Johnson in Boswell’s, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL 
JOHNSON 448 (1791). 
41. NUSSBAUM, POLITICAL EMOTIONS, supra note 36, at 256. 
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quick to argue (they are never slow to argue) that even if patriotism is a virtue, it 
does not necessarily follow that patriotism should be pursued through corporate 
operations.  For these thinkers, patriotism may be like environmentalism: an 
important goal, but one better achieved through mechanisms other than corporate 
governance.  Indeed, it may be that excluding patriotism from the corporate domain 
is crucial to supporting its greater flourishing in society generally.  Shareholder 
primacy may be essential to creating the material prosperity that can support 
humanity’s pursuit of such ennobling projects as patriotism and morality.  More 
subtly, Stephen Bainbridge argues (in a different, but relevant context) that 
American corporations, made powerful by shareholder primacy, stand as an effective 
bulwark against “the slavering maw” of Leviathan,42 keeping alive a vital civil 
society that stands between the people and a too-powerful, commanding State.43  
This space of voluntary action is where authentic patriotism flourishes.  These 
claims could be restated as the view that patriotism is ultimately best served by 
corporations behaving without regard to a patriotic conscience.  It replicates the 
canonical claim by advocates of shareholder primacy that corporations ultimately 
serve society best by focusing only on shareholder value, and behaving without 
specific regard for any competing non-shareholder interests, or other moral aims.44  
We must review that canonical claim before we can assess its application to the 
question of corporate patriotism.45  It goes like this: 
Capital is scarce, and its investment is crucial if we are to create jobs and make 
consumer goods widely available.  Shareholder primacy in corporate governance 
gives owners of capital the incentive they need to invest in diverse corporate 
operations over which they will have little control, and from which they will have no 
chance of exit unless they can sell their shares to a willing buyer.  Workers and 
consumers do not need attention in corporate governance, because they are well-
positioned to monitor their own interests in corporate operations.  Workers can 
directly, or through unions, negotiate the terms of their employment at the factory.  
Consumers can manage their corporate involvement by examining the quality and 
suitability of goods on offer.  Unlike locked-in shareholders, workers and consumers 
can credibly, continuously threaten to stop making their contributions to corporate 
operations if they are unsatisfied with the returns the firm is providing them.   To 
keep good workers, firms must offer competitive wages. To attract additional 
 
42. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of 
Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 895 (1997). 
43. Id. at 897. 
44. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 8. 
45. See generally Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of 
Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2004) (summarizing and critiquing 
justifications for shareholder primacy in corporate law). 
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consumer dollars, they must provide desirable goods at a good price.  Since 
shareholders only receive profits, in the form of dividends, after consumers have 
received their goods and workers have been paid their wages, defenders of 
shareholder primacy insist that all stakeholders are necessarily served when 
directors aim to improve the lot of shareholders.   
Now, realistic proponents of shareholder primacy do admit that once firms are 
charged with profit-maximization, they will duly pursue those profits wherever they 
can be found, including by dealing sharply with non-shareholders in ways those 
groups are unable to monitor or detect.  Most obviously, firms may skimp on worker 
or consumer safety when they can get away with it.  Or they may pollute the 
environment to reduce the costs of production and increase profitability.  Despite 
these social vulnerabilities, the canonical view is that corporate governance should 
still not deviate from its efficient, effective focus only on generating wealth for 
shareholders.  Instead, advocates of shareholder primacy insist that directors should 
be made to pursue the goal of shareholder profit subject to external regulations that 
the government sets out to protect non-shareholders (e.g., labor laws, consumer 
protection statutes, and environmental laws), thereby forcing firms to pursue profits 
in non-exploitative ways.  This commitment to external regulation sees no need, and 
leaves no quarter, for other values, such as patriotic conscience, in corporate 
governance.     
I have argued elsewhere that this account of shareholder primacy does not add 
up, even on its own terms.46  My critique has focused on the implausibility of relying 
on external government regulation to curb the exploitative impulses that 
shareholder primacy in corporate governance creates.  Corporations charged with 
pursuing profits for shareholders will do so not only by exploiting non-shareholders 
in the market, but also by operating within the political domain to stunt the 
development of profit-disrupting regulations that would impede such exploitation.  
This can take the form of stymieing protective regulations that would otherwise 
constrain profitability, or it may involve pursuing artificially onerous regulations 
that favor incumbent firms over new entrants, reducing competition that would 
otherwise benefit workers and consumers.47 
Again, mainstream corporate theorists do accept that corporations will endeavor 
to capture regulation in pursuit of profit.  But they still want corporations only to 
focus on shareholders.  What should be done, shareholder primacists used to insist 
(from their last refuge) is that corporations should be kept out of the political arena, 
thus allowing the government to set up protective regulations free of corporate 
 
46. See, e.g., David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social 
Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N. C. L. REV. 1197 (2011).    
47. See id. 
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influence.  Before Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,48 that was an 
intellectually defensible position.  But now it is implausible.  Citizens United holds 
that corporations have a constitutional right to political engagement.   As long 
as Citizens United is good constitutional law, shareholder primacy will be bad 
corporate theory.49  The legitimacy of shareholder primacy in corporate governance 
depends upon a robust regulatory system that is insulated from corporate influence. 
This public-choice critique of the shareholder primacy model has special 
resonance in the analysis of corporate patriotism.  Firms may work to undermine 
labor, consumer, or environmental restrictions otherwise aimed at protecting 
American interests, for the sole purpose of serving their shareholders.  While it may 
be said that government action, operating always by command, cannot contain the 
element of volunteerism necessary to be called patriotic, political activity can be 
patriotic.  Indeed, political activity is illegitimate unless it is patriotic.  The “norm of 
public reason” requires political speakers to restrain private, selfish interests in 
favor of advancing arguments, to the public and when directly lobbying government, 
that reflect sincerely held conceptions of the public good.50  But corporations do not 
speak in such a fashion. They only speak from a motive to serve shareholder 
interests.  Indeed, if corporations do speak to serve the public interest, that speech 
is illegitimate from a corporate law perspective, at least when such speech conflicts 
with the interests of their shareholders.  Firms may certainly claim there is harmony 
between the public interest and the policies they pursue on behalf of shareholders, 
but even where this is so, the corporate speech can only be called public-spirited by 
coincidence.  Non-corporate persons may also attempt to capture governmental 
machinery for private gain, but it is not morally legitimate for them to do so, and the 
political activity of natural people is not necessarily privately motived, as it is with 
corporations.51  Shareholder primacy in the political arena disrupts the already 
fragile operation of the norm of public reason, which is a crucial piece of the 
machinery of patriotism.52   
 
48. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
49. See id. at 1199. 
50. See Dan Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 143-45 (2007) (describing, 
critiquing, and offering an alternative to the norm of public reason). 
51. Of course, this analysis only applies to (that vast majority of firms) that operate under the default 
shareholder primacy governance norm.  See Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy, supra 
note 6. 
52. It may be that the obviousness of this feature of corporate political speech exposes the 
implausibility of the norm of public reason in political discourse more generally.  We see that 
corporations only speak for private interest, and we then assume, maybe correctly, that natural 
people speak the same way.   Dan Kahan argues that the norm of public reason is implausible 
as a cognitive matter, in that motivated reasoning always infects our advocacy.  Pretensions to 
complying with the norm only antagonize our interlocutors, since they know we are not really 
abiding by it.  See Kahan, supra note 51.  Kahan proposes a creative, psychologically plausible, 
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It can now be seen that there is a conflict between the canonical account’s call for 
the creation of external government regulation to restrain the predictable overreach 
of shareholder primacy in corporate operations, and Professor Bainbridge’s claim, 
noted above, that one of the benefits of shareholder primacy is that it helps create 
powerful corporations that stand as a shield protecting civil society, where true 
patriotism lives, against an otherwise encroaching Leviathan.53  Supporters of 
shareholder primacy (including Bainbridge himself) recognize that shareholder 
primacy in corporate governance incentivizes exploitative, externalizing corporate 
operations, which in turn requires the maintenance of a large, powerful regulatory 
state to restrain such abuses.  A large state is implied by shareholder primacy, not 
negated by it.  And this large state, critics of shareholder primacy insist, cannot be 
relied upon to do what shareholder primacy advocates call on it to do.  Instead, 
shareholder primacy critics expect the state to be used by corporations to extend 
their pursuit of profits on behalf shareholders.  On this view, the state becomes a 
sword of the corporation. 
More recently, Bainbridge has argued that shareholder primacy in corporate 
governance would still be desirable even in a “Night Watchman State,” where the 
role of government was limited to contract-enforcement and policing.  This is pitched 
as a reply to the argument that firms will work to capture government in order to 
more effectively serve shareholder interests, rather than leaving government to curb 
corporate abuse.  If such a threat is real, Bainbridge reasons, then we should do 
without big government altogether, neither relying on it to curb corporate abuse, nor 
leaving it vulnerable to corporate capture.54     
This move has two basic failings.  First, it whistles past the problem that 
shareholder-primacy advocates had long admirably admitted, that shareholder-
primacy firms will have the incentive and often the power to exploit non-
shareholding stakeholders.  The “Night Watchman” argument retreats to the less 
desirable position which claims that such exploitation is worth leaving unremedied 
in light of the gains that shareholder primacy otherwise provides to society.  Second, 
if Citizens United is to remain good constitutional law in the Night Watchman State 
(and Bainbridge is a defender of the Citizens United decision), then the night 
 
philosophically acceptable, but unfortunately named alternative to the norm of public reason, 
which he calls “expressive over-determination.”  Id.  The broader reform of political discourse 
norms would require a reform of the way corporations speak to and about their non-
shareholding stakeholders, which I explore in David G. Yosifon, Discourse Norms as Default 
Rules: Structuring Corporate Speech to Multiple Stakeholders, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 189, 191-92 
(2011). 
53. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.  
54. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Night Watchman State, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 39, 52-53 (2015). 
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watchman will not be kept to her limited duties for long.  Shareholder primacy firms 
will recognize that profits can be made by pushing for the growth of government and 
influencing its operation in the service of shareholders.  The Citizens United State 
will swallow the Night Watchman State with a shareholder-centric Leviathan.55 
Profit-maximizing decisions to operate corporations internationally may also 
have other adverse collateral effects on the dynamics of patriotic conscience.  It could 
plausibly be argued that international corporate operations threaten to marginalize 
the importance of national identity, and depth of patriotic sentiment, among people 
generally.  International corporations disaggregate ownership and control, and 
production and consumption, across national borders.  Where the national 
connection between production and consumption is severed, an important 
relationship that might otherwise form the basis of patriotic sentiment is 
destroyed.56  I have in mind the community that is created by the production of food 
in the American heartland, and its consumption on the American coasts.  The 
production of durable goods in Michigan, for consumption in Mississippi.   As 
production and consumption are separated across national borders, the patriotic 
imagination thins.57     
In summary then, if patriotism is a virtue, corporate law may be a vice.  
Shareholder primacy excludes patriotic conscience from the boardroom, leading 
firms to make decisions without regard to the national interest.  For firms operating 
in the international arena, this may often cause them to makes decisions that 
undermine American interests or advance the interests of competing nations.  
Government regulation cannot be counted on to curb such anti-patriotic corporate 
abuses, in part because shareholder primacy corporations will operate politically to 
stunt regulatory efforts, in continued service to their shareholders.  Such political 
activity also pollutes the waters of legitimate political discourse with strictly private 
expression, poisoning a crucial but fragile environment in which authentic 
 
55. See David Yosifon, The Citizen’s United Gambit In Corporate Theory: A Reply to Bainbridge on 
Strine and Walter 6 (Santa Clara Sch. Law, Working Paper No. 4-14, 2014) 
56. See Yosifon, The Social Relations of Consumption, supra note 32.  
57. The expansion of consumer culture and the rise of global corporate operations has perhaps made 
patriotism a more routine issue in the lives of ordinary people than it was in earlier eras.  For 
previous generations, the question of patriotism emerged as a decisional matter only episodically, 
for example, when deciding whether to volunteer for military service in times of war.  In previous 
eras, consumer goods, being generally nationally produced, did not implicate the question of 
national advantage.  “Marginal patriotism,” if I may, is a feature of consumer culture under global 
capitalism.  Consumers must continually decide whether to favor American or universal interests 
in their consumption behavior.  In this way patriotism becomes a monetized, routine problem, 
instead of an exceptional encounter that is not reducible to dollars.  Consumers may prefer marginal 
patriotic decisions to be made “in-house” at the level of corporate governance, rather than serially 
struggling with them “in the market.”  See David G. Yosifon, Towards a Firm-Based Theory of 
Consumption, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 447, 460 (2011). 
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patriotism may otherwise be nurtured.  By disaggregating the corporate nexus of 
ownership, control, production, and consumption across national borders, firms with 
international operations also compromise the conditions of community-identification 
that are necessary to the effective operation of patriotic impulse. 
*** 
Before concluding this sub-section, a special word is in order about the patriotic 
implications of corporate “tax inversions,” the subject that so raised the ire of 
President Obama in the speech referenced at the start of this Article.58  The 
shareholder primacy norm may from time-to-time compel directors, acting in good 
faith, to pursue fundamental changes in corporate structure, including re-chartering 
from the United States to some foreign jurisdiction in order to obtain more favorable 
tax treatment.59  Tax-inversions fundamentally alter the relationship between a 
corporation and the nation in which it was created.  When a corporation re-charters 
in Ireland or Singapore, it no longer relies on Delaware or the United States for its 
existence. While there is a hallowed tradition in American legal and popular 
discourse insisting on the propriety of lawful tax avoidance,60 this latitude would 
seem to stop at the border.  Nobody would consider it un-American to move from 
New Jersey to Texas to find a more favorable tax situation.  But a person who 
renounces American citizenship and moves to another country for tax purposes has, 
in our morality, some pretty fancy explaining to do if they want to situate themselves 
still as an American patriot.    
Ironically, however, corporate tax inversions may actually mitigate the problem 
of corporate influence in the American political process, thereby giving clearer reign 
to the play of patriotic sentiment by natural persons in the political process, and 
making shareholder primacy in firm governance more theoretically sound.  When 
an American corporation re-charters in another country it falls subject to federal law 
 
58. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
59. See David G. Yosifon, “Corporate Tax Ethics,” The Corporate Social Responsibility Podcast (2014), 
https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/corporate-social-responsibility/id807976212?mt=2 (interview 
with executives at Flextronics, Inc., a global manufacturing concern, regarding the ethics of 
corporate tax inversions). 
60. See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934). (“Any one may so arrange his 
affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which 
will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”) (Hand, 
J.); Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2nd Cir. 1947) (“Over and over again 
courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging one’s affairs as to keep taxes as 
low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public 
duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary 
contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere cant.”) (Hand, J., dissenting).  
Hand was also the author of one of the most celebrated texts explaining and celebrating 
American patriotism: The Spirit of Liberty (1944).  See infra text accompanying note 113 
(discussing this essay).  
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that forbids foreign corporations from making expenditures in connection with local, 
state, or federal elections in the United States.61  And this kind of restriction may 
still be constitutionally permissible.  The majority in Citizens United specifically 
noted that its holding “need not reach the question whether the Government has a 
compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from 
influencing our Nation’s political process.”62  The speech restriction that was before 
the Court in that case was “not limited to corporations or associations that were created 
in foreign countries or funded predominately by foreign shareholders.  It therefore 
would be overbroad even if we assumed, arguendo, that the Government has a 
compelling interest in limiting foreign influence over our political process.”63 
To deepen this irony, however, consider that legitimate patriotism may require 
that foreign corporations be given the right to participate in American political 
discourse, especially if American corporations are doing so.  Nussbaum rightly 
insists that because patriotic impulses will always threaten to unjustly malign 
foreigners, a robust patriotism must have in place free speech guarantees so that 
such foreigners can express and defend themselves, and constrain that malignant 
tendency.64  A righteous patriotism must submit to the constraint of foreign 
influence.   
III. Patriotism and the Corporate Board 
The first part of this Article was concerned with assessing whether corporate 
 
61. See 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2015) (“unlawful for (1) a foreign national . . . to make- (A) a contribution 
or . . . [an] independent expenditure . . . for an electioneering communication.”).  The statute 
goes on to state that “Foreign national” means “(1) a foreign principal, as such term is defined 
by section 611(b) of title 22.” Id. Section 611(b) of Title 22 defines a “foreign principal” as, inter 
alia, “(3) a partnership, association, corporation, organization, or other combination of persons 
organized under the laws of or having its principal place of business in a foreign country.” 22 
U.S.C. § 611 (2015). 
62. Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 
441e) (contribution and expenditure ban applied to “foreign national[s]”)). 
63. Id.  It is probably best to read Kennedy’s statement as genuine reservation of the issue, rather than 
a winking suggestion that he would be open to restrictions of this sort.  See also Matt A. Vega, The 
First Amendment Lost in Translation: Preventing Foreign Influence in U.S. Elections After Citizens 
United v. FEC, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 951, 1007 (2011).  Justice Stevens addressed the issue of foreign 
corporations several times in his Citizens United dissent.  In sardonic tones, he insists that the view 
of the First Amendment adopted by the majority would also protect speech by foreign firms: 
 [O]ur colleagues’ assumption that the identity of a speaker has no relevance to the 
Government’s ability to regulate political speech would lead to some remarkable conclusions. 
Such an assumption would have accorded the propaganda broadcasts to our troops by “Tokyo 
Rose” during World War II the same protection as speech by Allied commanders. More 
pertinently, it would appear to afford the same protection to multinational 
corporations controlled by foreigners as to individual Americans. 
 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 424. 
64. See Nussbaum, Teaching Patriotism, supra note 36, at 249-50.   
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patriotism is desirable or pernicious.  This section is concerned with exploring how 
we might get more corporate patriotism, if we desire it, or how we might better 
restrain it, if we do not.65 
As a matter of corporate law, and sometimes even reality, “the business and 
affairs of every corporation . . . [is] managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors.”66  Therefore, the place to focus (a crucial place to focus) in assessing the 
threat or promise of patriotic conscience in corporate operations is the boardroom. 
A. Director Nationality and Corporate Patriotism 
Directors, like all humans, have limited cognitive capacity and ethical restraint.67  
While the law requires directors to manage firms solely in the interest of 
shareholders, they do not always do so.  Sometimes they serve their own pecuniary 
or non-pecuniary interests, and sometimes they serve the interests of non-
shareholding stakeholders.68  If we assume that directors, like most people, are 
patriotic, then we must assume that directors’ patriotic conscience will at some 
margin influence corporate decision-making.  It may even happen (or most often 
happen) subconsciously, or in ways that directors, through motivated reasoning, are 
able to subjectively experience as being consistent with their fiduciary obligations.  
This “patriotic slacking” may be socially desirable or it may be pernicious, depending 
on your assessment of the claims reviewed in the previous section, but either way, it 
compels us to think about the consequences of the nationalities of directors serving 
on corporate boards.69     
 
65. Morse & Shive, supra note 15, argue that there is a global capital-allocation bias that results 
from investors privileging national firms over foreign ones. “Asset pricing theory predicts that 
investors should hold the world market portfolio, not a portfolio primarily of domestic stock. 
Country portfolios with small domestic holdings are, however, simply not observed.” Id. They 
find a significant impact: “The economic magnitude of patriotism’s effect is large: an average 
country invests 3-5% more for its aggregate portfolio abroad with a one standard deviation drop 
in patriotism.” Id. Now that’s econometrics. The claim that capital has a preference for 
patriotism might suggest a reason for expanding, beyond wealth maximization, the permissible 
bounds of what it means to serve shareholder interests, even under a shareholder primacy 
regime. But serving the patriotic preferences of capital becomes difficult in firms with globally 
dispersed stockholders. To the extent that national diversity in shareholder-base undermines 
non-pecuniary common denominators, then shareholder wealth maximization inevitably 
becomes the more exclusive focus of corporate governance. Cf. Edward B. Rock, Shareholder 
Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 849 (2012). I do not pursue the question 
of shareholders’ preference for patriotism here, because I am less interested in the narrow 
question of what capital wants from corporate governance than I am in the more fundamental 
questions of what society wants, or should want, and can expect to get from it.             
66. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2014 West). 
67. See generally Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 15. 
68. See Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309, 1310 
(2008). 
69. We might expect the magnitude of this “patriotic slack” to be a function of the strength of directors’ 
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Now hold on a minute.  We must stand guard against the known devils of patriotic 
discourse: stereotyping and xenophobia.  The reader should be wary, as is the 
author.  Yet there seems to be no escape from the demographic inquiry.  If directors 
cannot be trusted to always restrain their patriotic conscience where the law calls 
for shareholder primacy, or if I am wrong in my depiction of corporate law and it 
already countenances non-shareholderist impulses on corporate boards,70 then the 
patriotic commitments of corporate directors, to the United States or another 
country, becomes an issue of real concern.  So we must proceed, suspicious of 
ourselves and our reasoning, and only ever provisionally committing to our 
conclusions.   
If patriotism is a vice, then it may be desirable to encourage large firms, especially 
those with international operations, to populate their boards with directors 
reflecting a broad array of nationalities.  Each director’s personal patriotic instincts 
might counterbalance their fellow director’s instincts, with no national bias 
prevailing.   On the other hand, if patriotism is a virtue, then it might be desirable 
to ensure that the boards of American firms operating internationally are dominated 
by American nationals, such that inevitable directorial slack manifesting in the 
patriotic dimension will privilege American interests, rather than those of some 
foreign country.   
Little is known, empirically, about the nationality composition of corporate boards 
or the implications of director nationality on corporate governance dynamics.  After 
surveying the literature, one group of researchers found that “[d]espite extensive 
ongoing research on boards of directors, . . . the internationalization of corporate 
boards remains relatively unexplored.”71  Neither Delaware, nor the federal 
 
patriotism, on the one hand, and the strength of corporate law, on the other.  Because American 
corporate law is typically viewed as the “best,” in the sense that it most effectively reduces 
directorial slack, we might expect American corporations dominated by American directors to be 
relatively less patriotic for America, and foreign corporations dominated by foreign citizens to be 
relatively more patriotic for foreign countries.  See Lars Oxelheim & Trond Randoy, The Impact of 
Foreign Board Membership on Firm Value, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 2369, 2370 (2003) (“The Anglo-
American system is commonly regarded as the most demanding corporate governance system.”)  
However, Americans start out with a more patriotic baseline, so this may counterbalance the 
strength of American corporate law, resulting in similar rates of patriotic slack as are seen in 
nations with less patriotism, and weaker corporate law.  Perhaps Morse & Shive can run the 
numbers.  See supra, note 16.   
70. See supra note 7 (noting that some scholars disagree with my description of prevailing corporate 
law standards). 
71. Oxelheim & Randoy, The Impact of Foreign Board Membership on Firm Value, supra note 70, at 
2370 (noting that the “process of globalizing corporate governance systems has recently been 
invigorated by the general abolition of capital controls and better access to a global shareholder 
base.”). Writing about Nordic firms, Oxelheim and his collaborators did find support for their 
reasonable hypothesis that “firm internationalization relates to the internationalization of the 
boardroom.” Lars Oxelheim et al., On the Internationalization of Corporate Boards: The Case of 
Nordic Firms, 44 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 173, 173 (2013). More particularly, internationalization of the 
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securities laws, nor the major stock exchanges require firms to report the nationality 
of directors who are serving on their boards or running in corporate elections.  
Likewise, biographies of directors in annual reports generally do not include this 
information.  Director nationality may be an element of disclosure that should be 
pursued in order to allow tracking and evaluation of patriotic concerns.   
Nevertheless, there are economic and legal reasons to expect that American 
corporations with global business operations will increasingly have higher 
proportions of foreign national directors serving as corporate directors.  Firms might 
find this profitable for several reasons.  If the company is operating in another 
country, a national of that country might be better placed than American directors 
to monitor the firm’s foreign operations. A foreign national may have special, subtle 
knowledge about how to effectively reach customers in their own homeland—insight 
that may not be readily apparent to American directors.  A foreign-national director 
might also have a network of contacts and resources in the foreign country that will 
lower the firm’s costs of attracting capital and workers, or managing regulatory 
relations with the foreign government or local communities.72  These “connections” 
can be among the main benefits that a foreign director brings to a board.73 
 
boardroom “relates primarily to the financial internationalization of these firms.”  Id.  The authors 
made their prediction based on the fact that, “[a] vast psychological literature also shows that 
trustworthiness is enhanced by perceived demographic similarities, shared norms and values.”  Id. 
at 176.  For that reason, they expected that “foreign shareholders may be more confident that 
directors from their own country will represent their interests more forcefully.”  Id. 
72. See STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 8 at 79-80 
(explaining that the three main functions of corporate directors are providing oversight of firm 
operations, including hiring, compensating, and firing the Chief Executive Officer, helping 
guide development of the firm’s broad strategies, and forging connections between the firm and 
outside resources to which the director has special access).    
73. One interesting study, however, found that corporations with foreign independent directors 
performed worse along a number of measures, including incidents of intentional misreporting, 
higher CEO pay, and overall return on investment, than firms without such directors.  See Ronald 
W. Masulis et al., Globalizing the Boardroom: The Effects of Foreign Directors on Corporate 
Governance and Firm Performance, 53 J. ACCT. & ECON. 527, 529 (2012).  This study found that 
among S&P 1500 companies from 1998 to 2006, FIDs (the authors’ acronym for foreign independent 
directors) accounted for about 13 percent of all independent directors, and that for boards with at 
least one FID, they accounted for 18 percent of all independent directors.  Id. at 529.  The authors 
conclude that while for individual firms in given years FIDS can be very valuable, on net, these 
gains do not compensate for the losses otherwise associated with FID presence on the boards of U.S. 
corporations.  Id.  
      The principle explanation these researchers gave for their findings is the high transactions 
costs FIDs bear in traveling long distances for board meetings and other corporate functions.  
Id.  The authors found that FIDs are “nearly three times more likely” to miss 25 percent of 
board meetings than are non-FIDs.  Id.  This explanation seems inadequate to me.  As the 
authors note, Delaware allows attendance at board meetings by telephone.  Id. at 535 n.22.  The 
only additional transaction cost regarding telephonic attendance would possibly be 
inconvenient meeting times due to time-zone differences.  But odd-hour board meetings for FIDs 
might cut in favor of availability for busy executives with competing responsibilities.  The 
authors do allow as a secondary explanation the influence on the FIDs of their homeland’s law, 
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From a legal perspective, Delaware corporate law and federal securities 
regulations may also be pushing American firms with global operations to put 
foreign nationals on their boards.  Leo Strine, now Chief Justice of the Delaware 
Supreme Court, made clear in one of his last cases as Chancellor of the Delaware 
Court of Chancery, that corporate boards with operations in foreign countries must 
have directorial eyes and ears in those foreign countries if they are to satisfy their 
monitoring obligations under Delaware law.74  In Re Puda Coal, Inc. Stockholders 
Litigation was a case alleging that a Chinese-national, independent director of a 
Delaware corporation doing business in China, had stolen assets belonging to the 
company.75  When two other U.S-based independent directors became aware of the 
theft, they resigned.76  Shareholders brought suit against the allegedly thieving 
director, and against the directors on whose watch the thieving occurred.  After 
entering a default judgment against the absent Chinese director,77 then-Chancellor 
Strine refused to dismiss the case against the American directors.  From the bench, 
he said:   
If you’re going to have a company domiciled . . . in Delaware and the 
assets and operations of the company are situated in China that 
[sic], in order for you to meet your obligation of good faith, you better 
have your physical body in China an awful lot.  You better have in 
place a system of controls to make sure that you know that you 
actually own the assets. You better have the language skills to 
navigate the environment in which the company is operating.78  
Strine goes on (as is his want): 
[I]f the assets are in Russia, if they’re in Nigeria, if they’re in the 
Middle East, if they’re in China . . . you’re not going to be able to sit 
in your home in the U.S. and do a conference call four times a year 
and discharge your duty of loyalty.  That won’t cut it.  That there 
will be specific challenges that deal with linguistic, cultural and 
 
culture, and norms, which are often more lax on corporate governance standards than those 
that prevail in the United States: “we do find that FIDs from weak corporate governance 
countries display an even greater tendency to miss board meetings than FIDs from strong 
corporate governance countries.” Id. at 551.   
74. See Oral Argument and the Court’s Ruling, In re Puda Coal, Inc., Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 
6476-CS (Del. Ch., Feb. 6, 2013) at 17-18, available at http://www.delawarelitigation.com/files/2013/ 
02/puda-case.pdf [hereinafter Puda Coal]. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id.  Strine recognized that the default judgment he was entering against the Chinese national 
director was going to be difficult to enforce, given that the defendant was in China.  Id. at 26.  This 
is another dimension of concern in the effective regulation of corporate governance where there is 
increased service of foreign nationals on the boards of domestic corporations.  
78. See id. at 17-18.      
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others [sic] in terms of the effort that you have to put in to discharge 
your duty of loyalty.   
. . . . 
If it’s a situation where, frankly, all the flow of information is in the 
language that I don’t understand, in a culture where there’s, 
frankly, not legal strictures or structures or ethical mores yet that 
may be advanced to the level where I’m comfortable?  It would be 
very difficult if I didn’t know the language, the tools.  You better be 
careful there.79 
Strine is clearly signaling that for corporations with international operations, at 
least some directors may need implicit cultural knowledge of the foreign societies in 
which their firms are doing business.  Moreover, his disquisition showcases the 
magic words that bring fear, or hope, to corporate lawyers (depending on their side 
of the “v.”).  Having deep knowledge of the countries in which their firm is operating 
is a matter of directorial “good faith.”80  It is a matter of “loyalty.”81  Under Delaware 
law, corporate charters may protects directors from having to pay damages for 
violations of their duty of care to the corporation, but exposure to damages for 
violations of good faith and loyalty always remains.82  All of the real action in 
shareholder litigation today, therefore, is over what counts as loyalty and good faith.  
Strine is signaling that knowledge of foreign places, mores, and ways of life, for firms 
with international operations, is very much a part of the action.  This may have the 
effect of pushing boards to appoint more foreign nationals as directors.  
Beyond Delaware, there may be implications for board nationality demographics 
in the relentless push by the federal government and the national stock exchanges 
for “independent” directors on the boards of large corporations.  The Sarbanes-Oxley 
reforms of 2002 required for the first time that the boards of publicly traded 
corporations be comprised of a majority of independent directors.83  After the 
 
79. Id. at 21-22.  Strine may be engaging here more in aspirational suasion than actual legal line 
drawing.  Nevertheless, such talk from a Delaware jurist, now the Chief Justice of the Delaware 
Supreme Court, can be highly influential even where it is not, strictly speaking,, making law.  See 
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 
1009, 1103 (1997) (arguing that even as Delaware courts usually decline to formally hold directors 
liable for violating their fiduciary obligations to shareholders, Delaware jurists nevertheless 
endeavor to influence directorial conduct by signaling best practices and shaming poor conduct).      
80. See Puda Coal, supra note 74 at 17. 
81. Id. at 21. 
82. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2015) (“[T]he certificate of incorporation may also contain 
. . . A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director . . . for monetary damages 
for breach of fiduciary duty as a directory, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit 
the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty . . .  [or] (ii) for acts or 
omissions not in good faith.”). 
83. See generally Jeffery N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: 
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007). 
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subprime mortgage crisis of 2008, “the trend toward board independence accelerated 
as Congress and other regulators appointed independent directors as the capitalist 
cavalry and charged them with riding to the system’s rescue.”84  This push to put 
independent directors on corporate boards, coupled with increasingly strict 
definitions of what counts as “independent,” may have the unintended consequence 
of sending search firms more regularly onto foreign shores, looking for qualified 
foreign nationals as candidates to serve on domestic boards of directors.85 
If corporate patriotism is a vice, then the legal and business forces that would 
seem to be compelling the internationalization of the boards of American companies 
should be celebrated and extended.  If corporate patriotism is a virtue, then these 
dynamics may need to be critically assessed in terms of their impact on the patriotic 
impulses of domestic firms.    
B. Prescriptive Corporate Patriotism 
Despite marginal opportunities for slacking, of patriotic or more selfish varieties, 
the law of fiduciary duty, incentive-based pay structures, and corporate culture, 
keep directors of American corporations working “hard and honest,”86  for the most 
part,87on behalf of the shareholders.  If we presume that directors largely restrain 
their patriotic conscience, as the law requires, and if corporate patriotism is a virtue, 
then we may want to reform our corporate governance standards to improve its 
patriotic comportment. The challenge is to develop ethically responsible reforms that 
invite patriotism into the boardroom, while keeping the door shut to bigotry and 
discrimination.  This mix is hard enough to get right in the individual human heart.  
It will prove harder still to build into the design of our corporate governance law.  
Yet the importance of the issue compels us to struggle for a proper solution, lest 
 
84. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 78 (Oxford 
University Press, 1st ed. 2012). 
85. See Scott C. Herlihy, et. al., Director Tenure: A Solution in Search of a Problem, Harvard Law 
School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (January 23, 2015), 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/23/director-tenure-a-solution-in-search-of-a-problem 
(“[G]ood directors are hard to find.  . . . [O]nly a limited number of people possess both the 
management experience and industry knowledge required to serve capably as public company 
directors.  Further restrictions on board service dramatically shrink that limited pool of 
talent.”).  See also Oxelheim & Randoy, supra note 70, at 2374 (“There is a limited pool of board 
candidates in a small country, and a conflict of interest can easily arise in connection with 
interlocking board membership.”).  Oxelheim and Randoy conclude that foreign firms find 
substantial value in putting American directors on their boards.  Id. at 2394.  This increases 
the “demand” for American directors, further drawing away the supply available for American 
firms, and forcing more firms to bring on foreign directors.  
86. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 90-93 (1991) 
(characterizing the essence of fiduciary duty). 
87. Id. 
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others work towards solutions that we may deem improper.   
In 2008, a U.S.-based activist-shareholder submitted a “shareholder proposal” to 
the Board of Directors of the Monsanto Corporation, a Delaware corporation with 
global operations, which, if adopted by the shareholders, would have required 
Monsanto’s corporate directors to “solemnly swear (or affirm)”88 this oath: 
I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States 
against all enemies, foreign and domestic. I will bear true faith and 
allegiance to the Constitution of the United States. I take this 
obligation freely—recognizing that approval of my nomination and 
election as a Director of the Board of the Monsanto Corporation 
brings with it significant personal responsibility. I take this oath 
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I 
will well and faithfully discharge the duties upon which I am about 
to enter.89 
Monsanto petitioned the SEC for permission to exclude the proposal from the 
corporate proxy, pursuant to SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(2), which allows a shareholder 
proposal to be excluded if it would “cause the company to violate any state, federal, 
or foreign law to which it is subject.”90  Monsanto claimed that the proposal conflicted 
with Delaware law: 
[T]he Proposal . . . would impermissibly restrict the directors’ 
exercise of their fiduciary duties. . . . The directors could be forced, 
as a result of taking the oath, to vote against (or refrain from taking) 
a proposed action even if such action were permissible under 
applicable law and, as determined by the directors in the exercise of 
their fiduciary duties, would otherwise be in the best interests of the 
Company and its shareowners.91 
This is an interesting confession of a major corporate board’s view of the 
relationship between fiduciary obligation and national allegiance. The abiding 
principle, according to Monsanto, is “the Company and its shareowners.”92 Adhering 
to that charge can sometimes require directors to make decisions that may not 
comport with “true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States.”93 
Delaware law, of course, requires directors to always follow “applicable law,”94 but 
this “true faith and allegiance”95 verbiage suggests a responsibility for something 
 
88. Monsanto Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 8785663 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (Nov. 7, 
2008). [hereinafter Monsanto].  
89. Id. 
90. Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(2) (2015). 
91. Monsanto, supra note 88 at *3. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at *9. 
94. Id. at *3. 
95. Id. at *9. 
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more than that (at least it did to Monsanto’s lawyers), and the only “more” directors 
can know under Delaware law is more for the shareholders. The SEC allowed 
Monsanto to exclude the proposal from the corporate proxy by returning a “no action 
letter” that simply stated, without analysis or citation: “There appears to be some 
basis for your view that Monsanto may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(2).”96    
The Monsanto shareholders’ proposal did not outright forbid foreign nationals 
from serving on Monsanto’s board, but it would certainly have made board 
internationalization more difficult. Regulation of the nationality of corporate 
directors is not unknown in other countries. Danish corporations, for example, must 
have Danish citizens comprise at least half of the board, and the chairperson of the 
board must be Danish.97 In the United States, director-nationality restrictions in 
corporate charters or bylaws, or a reform of state-based corporate law to specify 
nationality requirements, would likely run afoul of federal prohibitions against 
“national origin” discrimination in hiring.98  
Even while steering clear of explicit nationality restrictions, the Monsanto 
shareholder proposal is an undesirable approach to improving the patriotic 
deportment of American firms. It neglects the global corporation’s legitimate needs 
for directors from many nations, and its purple “loyalty oath” approach would likely 
hinder, rather than advance, critical, searching discourse on patriotic concerns in 
the boardroom, even if we did want firms like Monsanto to have a patriotic 
conscience.  Nevertheless, the Monsanto shareholder proposal reflects an 
identification of, and effort to grapple with, the problems of corporate patriotism 
with which this Article has been concerned. The somewhat embarrassing loyalty 
oath proposal should motivate the development of reasonable alternative reforms.   
I think that a promising approach could be grounded in an alteration of directors’ 
fiduciary obligations in a manner that would encourage greater attention to the 
national interest in the course of corporate governance.  To begin to see how this 
might be done, let us consider a feature of the Delaware corporate code which would 
only mistakenly be viewed as having already done what I propose, but which could 
be built-upon, or tinkered with, to achieve my suggestion. For simplicity and clarity, 
when at the start of this article I described the law of corporate purpose in Delaware 
 
96. Id. at *15.  
97. Oxelheim & Radnoy, supra note 71, at 12 n.2.  
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2013) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice . . . to fail or refuse 
to hire . . . any individual because of such individual’s . . . national origin.”).  Title VII does 
permit national origin discrimination in hiring if it is “in the interest of the national security of 
the United States under any security program in effect pursuant to or administered under any 
statute of the United States or any Executive order of the President.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g).  
Again, this Article is concerned with the general case.  
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as being decidedly shareholderist,99 I held-back from the discussion an oft-neglected 
piece of statutory language which muddies the clarity of that picture, but does not 
alter the black letter law that it depicts. Section 122(12) of the Delaware corporate 
code provides that “every corporation . . . shall have power to . . . [t]ransact any lawful 
business which the corporation’s board of directors shall find to be in aid of 
governmental authority.”100  
This sub-section has received little scholarly attention, and has never been 
interpreted by any Delaware court. I have previously examined the history of the 
provision, and found the original intent behind it to be at least ambiguous.101 Despite 
that history, my assessment is that it is implausible to think that Delaware courts, 
asked to construe section 122(12), would find in it a fulcrum to reverse decades of 
their own jurisprudence specifying that shareholder primacy is the law in 
Delaware.102 Undoubtedly, this “power” would be interpreted as of a piece with other 
kinds of corporate powers (e.g., the power to own property, or enter contracts, or buy 
insurance for directors) all of which may only legitimately be exercised as means 
towards satisfying corporate law’s inveterate charge to serve the shareholders.    
Even if the provision were interpreted to allow corporate deviation from 
shareholder interests in order to serve governmental authority, an unresolved, 
pressing question for present purposes would remain: which governmental 
authority shall the corporate enterprise aid? Section 122(12) was based on a similar 
provision in the Model Business Corporation Act, the original 1950 version of which 
stated that every corporation “shall have power . . . in time of war to transact any 
lawful business in aid of the United States in prosecution of the war.”103 Delaware’s 
section 122(12) power applies much more broadly (not just during wartime), and 
does not specify which country the firm is authorized to aid. It might, for example, 
be an anti-American government that the corporation aids in pursuit of profit for its 
shareholders. The muddle of section 122(12) provides us with an opportunity to 
devise from its rudiments a patriotic corporate governance reform of our own 
 
99. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8. 
100. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(12) (West 2015). See generally David G. Yosifon, Corporate Aid of 
Governmental Authority: History and Analysis of an Obscure Power in Delaware Corporate Law, 10 
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1086 (2013). 
101. Id. 
102. See id. at 1103-1115. 
103. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 4(n) (West 1960) (emphasis added). This provision in the Model Act 
was clearly intended by its drafters to authorize departure from the shareholder primacy norm 
when aiding an American war effort. The official annotation to the provision stated: “The section 
explicitly recognizes that in time of war a corporation may validly assume responsibilities that it 
would not normally undertake in peacetime.” Id. (emphasis added). See also Yosifon, Corporate Aid 
of Governmental Authority, supra note 100, at 1091-95 (noting that while the drafters of Delaware’s 
§122(12) were influenced by the Model Act, it is not clear that they shared the Model Act’s views 
about the “governmental aid” power authorizing deviation from shareholder primacy).  
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design.104    
Such reform could be conceived at different levels of intensity.105 A modest 
corporate law reform could require that where a corporation faces a decision that 
would either favor the United States or favor some other country, and the choice 
would not affect profitability either way, then directors must choose the course that 
privileges America over other nations. A more significant reform would explicitly 
permit corporate directors to privilege the interests of the United States even where 
doing so would compromise shareholder value, if the shareholder interest is small 
relative to the national interest (for example, in a time of emergency or a period of 
crisis). A still more serious reform would require directors to do that. Or corporate 
law could permit or require directorial sacrifice of the shareholder interest in favor 
of the national interest, irrespective of the relative stakes in the corporate decision. 
Another approach would be to make these kinds of patriotic standards mutable, such 
that firms would be required to actively renounce a mandatory or permissive 
devotion to the United States if they did not want to be burdened by any such 
encumbrance on profitability.106  
The reforms that I am describing here would permit or require a patriotic 
conscience in corporate decision-making. They prescribe a change in corporate 
motive. Nothing has been said, nor can anything be said, about substantive changes 
in corporate behavior that would result. What kind of corporate decision is patriotic? 
Is it more patriotic for an American firm to keep a factory in the United States in 
order to provide jobs for American workers, or to shut down the American-based 
factory and move it to China, thus inserting an element of American influence in 
Chinese domestic affairs?107 This is a matter of judgment. Patriotism has no 
 
104. Of course, a patriotic corporation might endeavor to aid its homeland in ways that did not directly 
intersect with government authority at all.  See supra, text accompanying notes 42-43 (emphasizing 
the importance of civil society as a space in which patriotism is nurtured and acts). Section 122(12) 
speaks to aiding “governmental authority.”  There is evidence that the drafters of at least the Model 
Code provision on which Delaware’s provision was based intended this phrase to be interpreted 
very broadly to include any aspect of social life that government might touch on in the most general 
way.  See Yosifon, Corporate Aid of Governmental Authority, supra note 100, at 1103-13.  
105. Any reform that significantly modified shareholder primacy in corporate governance would have to 
be made through federal preemption of the state law of corporate chartering, or at least federal 
imposition of minimum governance standards on state charters. Delaware would never willingly 
give up shareholder primacy, and if it did, another state would quickly adopt it, since these are the 
charters capital prefers, if it can get them.    
106. See generally Ian Ayers, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 Yale. L. J. 
2032 (2012); see also Yosifon, Corporate Aid of Governmental Authority, supra note 100, at 1111-13 
(discussing the apparent immutability of section 122(12) as drafted).  
107. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 116-164 (1954). Berle, who 
was a diplomat before he was a scholar, emphasized the ways in which American influence has 
spread around the world often more effectively through America’s corporations than through its 
diplomatic corps. See also Stephen F. Diamond, The Myth of Corporate Governance (unpublished 
manuscript on file with author) (examining the relationship between Berle’s diplomatic work and 
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deductively applicable content. An act is authentically patriotic if the motive that 
produced it is (critically reflective) love for country; behavior cannot be called 
patriotic or unpatriotic simply by looking at what is done.108 Any reform that seeks 
to allow or compel a place for patriotism in the boardroom should emphasize process, 
never seeking to narrowly prescribe any orthodoxy in patriotic conscience. Corporate 
law already reflects the broad outlines of this framework. It rigidly distinguishes 
evaluations of proper fiduciary motivation from the evaluation of substantive 
decision-making. The former corporate law does in searching, demanding fashion, 
the latter it recognizes as “beyond the science of the chancery.”109  This light-handed 
approach to reform seeking greater corporate patriotism may strike some as unlikely 
to have much effect, if they are merely “orienting,” without any substantive valence, 
and with little chance for judicial enforcement.  But if corporate operations stripped 
of patriotic conscience are a threat to patriotic values, it is precisely because of the 
orientation of corporate governance presently achieved through the shareholder 
primacy norm, which does its powerful work without substantive edicts, or much 
judicial oversight.  At the heart of corporate power is corporate purpose; change that 
purpose and you can change the corporate heart. 
Many critics of shareholder primacy theory have suggested replacing it with an 
approach to corporate governance that requires directors to be more socially 
responsible by actively attending to multiple interests, rather than just 
shareholders.110  Proponents of shareholder primacy, however, have insisted that 
such a program is too intractable and would give directors too little guidance about 
how to govern.  Corporate patriotism may help bring a program of corporate social 
responsibility into a more plausible focus.  Consider this: some people talk about 
corporations closing domestic factories and moving jobs overseas as a failure of 
 
Berle’s scholarship). 
108. Nussbaum comes too close to violating this principle when she cites, for example, the “erosion of the 
New Deal in the United States” as an example of “institutions and laws” that have not “sustained 
themselves in the absence of love directed at one’s fellow citizens and the nation as a whole.”  
NUSSBAUM, POLITICAL EMOTIONS, supra note 36 at 214.  Conservative bias is also too often evident 
in academic discourse on patriotism.  See, e.g., Parker, supra note 39 at 410 (otherwise thoughtfully 
assessing the discourse of patriotism after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but not 
resisting the urge to write things like: “Recall the expectations of a return to ‘McCarthyism,’ 
mobilizing patriotic sentiment to compel political conformity.  (In some circles, Waiting for 
McCarthy is a habitual self-dramatizing pose.)”).  
109. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 547 (N.Y. 1928).  In contemporary corporate law terms this is 
known as the “business judgment rule.”  So long as directors’ decisions are informed, deliberate, 
disinterested, made in good faith, and legal, courts will not review the substance of the decision that 
was undertaken, even if it turns out to have been a poor, unusual, or disastrous decision for the 
corporation.  There is an extensive academic debate about the purpose of the business judgment 
rule, but its doctrinal basis can be easily understood as straight-forward fidelity to the statutory 
injunction that the board, and nobody else, runs the corporation.   
110. See generally Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, supra note 7. 
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corporate social responsibility.  But such behavior is only socially “irresponsible” if 
there is reason to consider the interests of American workers to be more important 
than those of foreign workers, who may be more desperate than their American 
counterparts.  Patriotism offers a sufficient level of abstraction, but one that is also 
not too abstract, to provide a framework through which corporate directors can 
approach the problem of social responsibility.  Indeed, if patriotism’s philosophers 
are to be believed, then it is impossible for a corporation, or a corporate board of 
directors, to behave morally or embrace a compelling sense of social responsibility, 
unless they have a morality, formed in and responsive to a devotion to a particular 
community—a particular nation.  Corporate patriotism may be a crucial component 
of corporate social responsibility.   
Whether corporate patriotism is repugnant or desirable, we should pursue 
reforms that encourage directors to be open and honest with themselves, each other, 
their shareholders, and the public, about the role that patriotism is or is not playing 
in their decision-making. Because patriotism is an important part of individual 
identity, and perhaps an important fulcrum of moral life, it is reasonable to believe 
that patriotic conscience is operating at some level in the boardroom. But corporate 
law as it currently stands precludes explicit, deliberative discourse on the patriotic 
questions implicated in corporate decision-making.  The law of corporate governance 
stands as a constant warning that directors will violate their fiduciary duties if they 
govern a manner other than in the shareholder interest. This is a recipe for confusion 
and obfuscation regarding the role of patriotic conscience in firm governance. We 
must make the threats and opportunities of patriotic conscience explicit.111 A critical 
kind of patriotism can only take root in and emerge out of the boardroom if directors 
are licensed, or compelled, to speak freely about their honest assessment of what 
impact a proposed course of corporate conduct will have on national interests.  
IV. Conclusion 
The law and policy of corporate conscience is presently undergoing important 
doctrinal and conceptual developments.112 In this milieu, it is likely that the question 
of corporate patriotism, never fully silent but often effectively ignored, will soon 
command the attention of the public and policymakers. When this moment strikes, 
 
111. See Nussbaum, Teaching Patriotism, supra note 36, at 224 (advocating a “critical public culture” 
that invites both patriotic display and continuous, searching assessment of the morality of the 
national project). 
112. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (corporate political speech rights under 
the U.S. Constitution); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. CT. 2751 (2014) (religious rights 
of corporations under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).  See also Elizabeth Pollman, A 
Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27 (2014); James D. Nelson, The Freedom of Business 
Association, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 461 (2015).  
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corporate theory should be prepared to play its part, clarifying and making explicit 
the terms and consequences of distinct positions.  
No particular viewpoint can find exclusive vindication in the assessment here 
provided. It is hoped that the stakes of corporate patriotism have been clearly posed, 
and routes towards either promoting or constraining it usefully suggested. When I 
set out on this project, it was my intention to develop and defend a specific claim 
about the legitimacy, or illegitimacy, of corporate patriotism. But I find myself 
finally less committed on the issue than when I began. In intellectual ventures, this 
is surely a sign that some difficult terrain has been traversed. But it also makes 
clear that some hard traveling remains. Further advance through the challenges 
posed by the problems of corporate patriotism will surely be best accomplished by 
embrace of that intellectual posture expressed by Judge Learned Hand in his 
exploration of the significance of patriotism: “What is the spirit of liberty? I cannot 
define it; I can only tell you my own faith. The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is 
not too sure it is right.”113  
 
 
 
 
 
113. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 190 (1952).  
